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This paper demonstrates that the fractional reserve system is a source of instability in commercial and investment banks. 
The purpose of investment banks is to enhance completeness of financial markets and thereby contribute to an efficient 
allocation of risk. When funds are raised through commercial banks to transact in securities of investment banks, this can 
cause instability to commercial and investment banks as is experienced currently in world financial markets.   
 
 





World financial markets experience currently great 
instability. There has recently been a major reduction in 
investment banks operations. This paper demonstrates that 
the fractional reserve system in commercial banks is a 
significant factor for instability of the banking sector. The 
purpose of investment banks is to enhance completeness of 
financial markets and thereby contribute to an efficient 
allocation of risk. When, however, funds are raised through 
commercial banks to engage in security transactions of 
investment banks, this can cause instability to commercial 
and investment banks. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents 
the commercial bank’s balance sheet as based on the 
fractional reserve principle. The third section explains the 
operation of commercial banks in light of their balance 
sheet. The section is based on the classical framework of 
bank runs due to Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The fourth 
section describes the financial principles underlying the 
operation of investment banks. In particular, this section 
highlights the main purpose of investment banks as 
institutions that contribute to the completeness of financial 
marks and thereby render the allocation of risk in financial 
markets more efficient. The last section concludes the paper 
with some remarks.  
 
A commercial bank’s balance sheet 
 
Banks receive deposits from customers to create loans. They 
operate under the principle of fractional reserves. That is, 
banks retain only a fraction of deposits and the rest they use 
to finance illiquid (long term) projects which are more 
profitable than liquid (short term) projects. This raises the 
possibility that a substantial number of depositors may 
decide to withdraw their funds from the bank for reasons 
unrelated to the need for liquidity; the outcome may be a 
bank run (e.g., Freixas and Rochet (1997), p. 20). 
 
Bank runs may be illustrated by a bank’s balance sheet (e.g., 




IOU (on maturity) 0.9A 
  
Deposits A 
(withdrawal on demand) 
 
The above bank’s balance sheet indicates that for an A size 
deposit (the bank’s liability in rands) the bank should retain 
only a fraction of A (say 10%) in cash (the bank’s liquid 
asset) and the rest the bank can lend in the form of an IOU 
with fixed maturity. Thus, the bank can honour a maximum 
10% of its liability in the case of a sudden withdrawal of 
deposits. The underlying principle of the above bank’s 
balance sheet is that the bank knows from past experience 
that no more than 10% of individuals’ deposits may be 
withdrawn within a certain time period.  This, however, 
exposes the bank to a run should the other 90% holders of 
deposits decide to withdraw their funds simultaneously.   
 
A classical explanation of bank runs 
 
The classical explanation of bank runs in a competitive 
environment is Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (for a review 
see Tirole (2006), pp. 447-468). Their explanation is the 
following. The bank receives deposits (which may be 
withdrawn on demand) from many risk averse customers. In 
turn, the bank invests the deposits in various projects. The 




bank tends to invest in long term illiquid projects where the 
return is R 1> , rather than in short term projects where the 
return is r 1= . The bank can liquidate a long term project at 
a penal return r 1= . At the time a deposit is made, the bank 
is unaware whether the customer is a short term or a long 
term depositor. The bank, however, knows from past 
experience that ‘on average’ a proportion Ρ  of customers 
are short term depositors and a proportion 1−Ρ  are long 
term depositors. Since the bank has many depositors, the 
law of large numbers applies: the bank knows with full 
certainty that Ρ  and 1−Ρ  are, respectively, the true 
proportions of short and long term depositors. Hence, the 
bank can act as a central planner under full certainty where 
it pools all deposits to maximise utility of all customers. The 
outcome of the bank’s pooling of deposits is Pareto optimal; 
and in particular, it supersedes a market solution.  
 
The main result of the above scenario of central planning by 
a commercial bank is that each short term depositor receives 
a payoff x 1>  for each 1 unit deposited; and each long term 
depositor receives a payoff y where R y x 1> > >  for each 
1 unit deposited. The Pareto optimality of this outcome 
gives justification for the operation of banks. This outcome, 
however, is predicated on the assumption that the 
proportions Ρ  and 1−Ρ  may not be altered because of any 
internal or external factors. If, however, this is not the case 
then a run may take place and the bank may run out of 
liquidity. Thus, the bank’s practice of pooling deposits for 
the sake of Pareto optimal allocation of returns between 
short and long term deposits is paradoxical: the Pareto 
optimal criterion may itself trigger a suboptimal outcome 
where a run on the bank happens. 
 
The above argument explains that the risk of bank runs is a 
direct consequence of the bank’s balance sheet as is depicted 
in the previous section. The bank’s operation as a receiver of 
deposits that may be withdrawn on demand, and a provider 
of loans at fixed maturity, is sound for as long as P 0,1=  
and 1 0,9−Ρ =  are maintained. That is, in the above bank’s 
balance sheet it is assumed that ( 0,1, 1 0,9) 1℘Ρ = −Ρ = ≈  
(in words, the probability ℘  that P 0,1=  is close to 1). The 
possibility, however, that ℘  may be significantly less than 
1, under any unforeseen circumstances, renders the bank 
susceptible to runs. 
 
Investment banking  
 
An investment bank issues or buys securities. The issue of 
securities may be considered as the investment bank’s 
deposits and the purchase of securities may be considered as 
its loans. Investment banks contribute to the completion of 
financial markets and until recently had a great influence on 
stock markets.  
 
Consider a case where the possible number of states of the 
world in an uncertain environment is S. (A state of the world 
is a complete description of any possible outcome of 
uncertainty (see e.g., Arrow and Hahn (1971), p. 122.) In an 
uncertain environment of S possible number states of the 
world, investment banks contribute to the maintenance of 
complete financial markets where the number of linearly 
independent securities is kept as close as possible to the 
number S. In turn, when markets are complete there exists, 
before the resolution of uncertainty, a market for each 
contingent security. The current purchase or sale in the 
contingent security market is a promise for future purchase 
or sell of the security when a certain state of the world 
appears in the future.  
 
It is important to note that although future delivery is 
contingent on the appearance of the state of the world, 
payment for a purchase of a contingent security is done at 
the present time. The funds to purchase the security are 
provided by a commercial bank where the security itself acts 
as collateral. In light of the fractional reserve principle in 
commercial banks, this can cause a financial crisis. If 
customers come to realize that, because of any reason, 
financial markets are due to decline, this can trigger a run on 
both, commercial banks and investment banks. Commercial 
banks would put pressure on their clients to repay their 
loans, and in turn individual investors will be forced to sell 
securities in investment banks to repay their loans in 
commercial banks. The outcome might be a strongly 
depressed securities market with clients’ equities fall short 
of their debt to commercial banks. In this regard a proper 
process of information revelation is essential to avoid a sell 
off of investment banks’ securities. Roughly put, a proper 
process of information revelation is one in which there is 
flow of information to distinguish between any two different 
states of the world (see e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995), p. 
690).   
 
It is known that in an environment of complete markets, at 
equilibrium (where no arbitrage is possible) risk is allocated 
efficiently. The contribution of investment banks in this 
regard is significant. In an episode of financial crisis, 
however, as is the case currently, the operation of 
investment banks may be restricted by outside agents to, 
seemingly, mitigate the crisis; furthermore, some contingent 
markets may be eliminated completely by regulation. If such 
unfortunate restrictions happen then the transfer of 
purchasing power between future states of the world will be 
restricted or completely prohibited. Reducing the likelihood 
of sell off of investment banks’ securities and avoiding runs 
on commercial banks depend ultimately on a proper 





Two factors for instability of the banking sector are, (i) the 
excess liquidity produced by commercial banks because of 
the fractional reserve system, and (ii) the excess liquidity 
may be provided in the form of collateralized loans to 
clients who wish to engage in security operations of 
investment banks. The two factors, when combined, may be 
a major cause for financial instability.  
 
Commercial banks are aware that depositors frequently 
reconsider their decisions regarding their deposits in light of 
the above. That is, depositors form posterior probabilities of 
bank run based on observed signals concerning the riskiness 
of commercial banks’ loans. The posterior probabilities may 






P(R )P( ) P(R )P( )
θ θ
θ =
θ θ + δ δ
, the letter R stands for the 
event ‘depositors look for signals that trigger run on the 
bank and they do find some’, the letters θ  and δ are two 
exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses; they are, respectively, 
the hypothesis that a run is due to take place or will not take 
place. Accordingly, P(  R)θ is the probability that 
depositors hypothesise that a run is due to happen and they 
find some evidence to support their hypothesis. It is known 
(e.g., Raiffa (1968), pp. 20-21) that even a small sample of 
observations renders the posterior probability P(  R)θ much 
greater than the prior probability P( )θ . Therefore, it may be 
sufficient to have some vague evidence on a bank run to 
trigger an actual run. 
 
Given the liquidity available in the market, investment 
banks act upon the prevailing market risk; the problem of 
financial instability, however, lies within the operation of 
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